

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: IVO

27 MAY 1975

SUBJECT: Security Policy on Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access to Sensitive Intelligence


TO: Chairman, USIB Security Committee *over*

1. The working group to study assignment and travel restrictions was formed on our motion to examine the "real" threat involved before attempting to rewrite the current policy. We found it difficult to determine the adequacy of the then proposed policy because we were unsure of the real security dangers.
2. After more than a year, the Working Group still has not determined whether official or unofficial travel to communist countries poses a threat to sensitive programs.
3. As currently implemented within the Air Force, assignment and travel restrictions lean heavily toward restriction of unofficial travel to "denied" or "hazardous" areas. This results not from a judgment that unofficial travel poses a greater threat than does official travel, but rather, from a pragmatic view that the job must get done and that the advantages of mission accomplishment may, and often do, outweigh any real or imagined risks involved.
4. The point has been made that the current restriction program may be subject to legal challenge. We must agree. However, we are not convinced that a constitutional question is involved nor that legislative relief is impossible. In fact, we believe that legislative relief should be explored if it is found that a threat exists which is sufficient to warrant continuation of a restriction program.
5. One of the points made by the subject paper is that risk is implicit in continuing divergence in individual agency security policies. However, the policy recommended provides much more room for divergence and much less hard guidance than does the current policy. For example, under the proposed policy, each USIB Agency determines which areas are hazardous and which are not. This could obviously lead to many different lists of hazardous areas. It is our contention that community policies and implementation should be as uniform as possible considering the various mission requirements involved.



25X1 6. We have not introduced an alternative policy statement because, as stated above, we do not believe the actual threat has yet been delineated sufficiently to decide what approach would be adequate. We must acknowledge that [redacted] briefing on the CIA Risk-of-Capture program was beneficial and interesting. However, his comments were generally applicable to situations involving trained intelligence agents and POW's. We believe that a great many other individuals in different situations may be targets of exploitation and that the overall threat to sensitive programs remains unclear.

7. Therefore, we recommend that this matter be referred to the Compartmentation Subcommittee with instructions that the threat to compartmented intelligence systems posed by official and unofficial travel in overseas areas be thoroughly evaluated and that a new policy be drafted based upon that threat. Further, the Subcommittee should be instructed to explore all possible avenues including legislative relief, if appropriate.


LEO F. OLSEN, JR., Colonel, USAF
Air Force Member
USIB Security Committee

Copy to: USIB Compartmentation
Subcommittee